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141
A PARENT'S

ADULTERY RAISES NO PRESUMPTION OF UNFITNESS FOR
CHILD CUSTODY. DAVIS v. DAVIS, 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231
(1977).
In Davis v. Davis' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
an adulterous 2 parent is not presumptively unfit for the custody of
her child. 3 While adulterous conduct remains a "relevant consideration" in custody disputes, it need only be considered to the extent
that it affects the child's welfare, and must be weighed along with
other pertinent factors. 4 In his tripartite opinion for the court, Judge
Digges noted the "rapid social and moral changes in our society"
that, perhaps, fomented the court's departure from the view that
adultery was a "highly persuasive
indicium" of unfitness, or raised a
"presumption of unfitness."'5 An adulterous parent need no longer
rebut such a presumption by satisfying a threefold test of termination of the relationship, repentence, and little likelihood of future
indiscretions. 6 The opinion did indicate, however, that evidence of
1. 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231 (1977).
2. Adultery can be proved by circumstantial evidence which establishes both a
disposition on the part of the defendant and the paramour to commit adultery
and an opportunity to commit the offense. See Pontorno v. Pontorno, 257 Md.
576, 263 A.2d 820 (1970); Doughtery v. Doughtery, 187 Md. 21, 48 A.2d 451 (1946).
3. Davis, 280 Md. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235.

4. Id.
5. Id. See, e.g., Shanbarker v. Dalton, 251 Md. 252, 247 A.2d 278 (1968); Ferster v.
Ferster, 237 Md. 548, 207 A.2d 96 (1965); Wallis v. Wallis, 235 Md. 33, 200 A.2d
164 (1964); Insogna v. Insogna, 229 Md. 33, 181 A.2d 677 (1962); Bray v. Bray, 225
Md. 476, 171 A.2d 500 (1961); Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960);
Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960); McCabe v. McCabe, 218 Md. 378,
146 A.2d 768 (1958); Widdoes v. Widdoes, 12 Md. App. 225, 278 A.2d 100 (1971).
See generally, 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.06 (2d ed. 1961); 20
MD.L. REV. 378 (1960).
6. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 33 Md. App. 295, 364 A.2d 130 (1976) (applied the
threefold test); cf. Oliver v. Oliver, 217 Md. 222, 140 A.2d 908 (1958) (divorce

granted on the basis of abandonment, not adultery, but the court said that had
the basis been adultery, the result would have been the same; although the court
did not explicitly apply the threefold test, the paramour had moved to Michigan,
indicating that the relationship had terminated and was not likely to begin
anew; the court did not discuss repentance); 19 MD.L. REV. 61 (1959). It is ironic
that both the court of appeals and the court of special appeals in Davis cited
Neuwiller v. Neuwiller, 257 Md. 285, 262 A.2d 736 (1970), as standing for what
seemed to be different propositions, namely, that Neuwiller employed the
threefold test of repentence, termination of the relationship, and little likelihood
of recurrence of the past conduct and also implied that no presumption of
unfitness arose from the fact of adultery. The latter proposition can be inferred
from Judge Barnes' strong dissenting opinion. The former was referred to only in
passing by the majority, although the basis of the dissent was founded upon
Judge Barnes' insistence that the threefold test should have been applied. What
Neuwiller may have turned upon, however, was not the presumption vel non that
an adulterous parent was unfit, but rather the presumption that "a young child
should not be taken from its mother." Neuwiller v. Neuwiller, 257 Md. 285,
286-87, 262 A.2d 736, 737 (1970). See generally Foster & Freed, Children and
the Law, 2 FAMILY L.Q. 40, 41 (1968). The presumption that a "young child" or a
"child of tender years" should not be taken from its mother may no longer be
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these factors retains validity in judging which parent would best
promote the child's welfare. 7 According to the court, Davis served to
recognize explicitly what prior Maryland cases had implied in their
treatment of adultery in child custody contests.8
The Davis court devoted the first section of its opinion to a
clarification of the formerly unsettled standard of appellate review
in child custody cases. 9 The court enumerated three categories for
the possible findings that a chancellor could make in a child custody
case. To each category, a different standard of appellate review
applied. The "harmless error" test applied to matters of law, while
the "clearly erroneous" standard applied to matters of fact. 10 The
chancellor's "ultimate conclusion" as to whom the child was
awarded was a matter neither of law nor of fact. Rather, the court
of appeals held that the "clear abuse of discretion" test applied to
such ultimate conclusions. The court noted that
[o]nly [the chancellor] sees the witnesses and the parties,
hears the testimony, and has the opportunity to speak with
the child[;] he is in a far better position than is an appellate
court, which' has only a cold record before it, to weigh the
evidence and determine what
disposition will best promote
2
the welfare of the minor.
In the absence of the application of unsound legal principles, or the
use of clearly erroneous factual findings, an appellate court could
correctly reverse a chancellor's child custody determination only if
the chancellor clearly abused his discretion.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.

valid in light of MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (Supp. 1976), which provides, in
part, that "in any custody proceeding, neither parent shall be given preference
solely because of his or her sex." Cf. Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900
(1977) (the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment, MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS,
art. 46, combined with MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1, imposing responsibility for
child support on both parents, dictated that the sex of a parent was not a factor
in the allocation of child support). But cf. Cooke v. Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 319
A.2d 841 (1974) (in dictum, said that the maternal preference in child custody
cases did not violate the Equal Rights Amendment because the issue was not the
rights of the parents, but rather the best interests of the child, and because the
preference applied only in the rare case when all other factors were equal). See
generally 2 U. BALT. L. REV. 355 (1973).
280 Md. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235.
Id.
Id. at 122-36, 372 A.2d at 232-34. This casenote will not address in detail that
portion of the Davis opinion which discussed the standard of appellate review in
child custody proceedings. The Davis standards have been applied by Maryland
courts in cases following Davis. E.g., German v. German, 37 Md. App. 120, 376
A.2d 115 (1977); Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 185, 372 A.2d 582, 590 (1977);
Howard v. Gish, 36 Md. App. 446, 373 A.2d 1280, Daily Record, August 23, 1977;
Christman v. O'Connor, 36 Md. App. 263, 373 A.2d 326, Daily Record, August 9,
1977.
280 Md. at 125-26, 372 A.2d at 234.
Id.
Id.
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While the Davis opinion clarified the standards for appellate
review in child custody cases, 13 the court suggested that its
treatment of an adulterous parent in such circumstances was not
novel. 14 Instead, the court of appeals' decision implied that the
presumption of unfitness had eroded, and that Davis merely
recognized this trend in Maryland law. 15 The gradual erosion of the
presumption of unfitness may not have been fully appreciated by
other Maryland courts, however. Prior to Davis, Maryland decisions
concerning the relevance of adultery seemed far from uniform. This
was best illustrated by the different treatments of adultery by the
chancellor and the court of special appeals in Davis.16 By directing
that the Maryland courts discard the presumption that an adulterous parent was unfit, the Davis decision provided a vehicle for a
more uniform application of the substantive guidelines in custody
cases.
The facts involved were not atypical.' 7 The Davis marriage
produced three children during its fifteen years.' 8 Some eight months
after Mrs. Davis left home with the youngest child, Leigh, Mr. Davis
9
on
filed a bill of complaint seeking a divorce a vinculo matrimonii1
20
the ground of his wife's adultery, and sought temporary and
permanent 2' custody of the children. Mrs. Davis filed a cross-bill of
13. Id. at 122, 372 A.2d at 232.
14. Id. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235.
15. Pontorno v. Pontorno, 257 Md. 576, 263 A.2d 820 (1970); Neuwiller v. Neuwiller,
257 Md. 285, 262 A.2d 736 (1970). Cf. Widdoes v. Widdoes, 12 Md. App. 225, 278
A.2d 100 (1971) (court stated that while the "rigors" of presumption of unfitness
may be relaxed in the future, it was "obliged to follow the established rule.")
16. The chancellor, after having noted the presumptions that arise from adulterous
conduct, considered the "best interest of the child" to be the paramount
consideration. Davis v. Davis, 33 Md. App. 295, 300, 364 A.2d 130, 132-33 (1976).
The court of special appeals agreed that the welfare of the child was the
"cardinal rule in custody cases," but exercised its own judgment in applying the
rule, accepting the chancellor's factual findings, but not necessarily his
conclusions. See Sartoph v. Sartoph, 31 Md. App. 58, 64, 354 A.2d 467, 472 (1976).
The court of special appeals proceeded to consider a series of guidelines,
including 1) the tendency not to disturb the custody of a child unless there was a
strong reason affecting his welfare, 2) the inclination to frown upon split custody
(referring to the award of, for example, one child to the father and another child
to the mother, as opposed to custody where the child spends equal time with each
parent), 3) the presumption that an adulterous parent was unfit, as well as 4) the
application of the threefold test, see note 36 infra, to rebut the presumption.
Davis v. Davis, 33 Md. App. 295, 301, 364 A.2d 130, 133 (1976).
17. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 120, 372 A.2d 231 (1977).
18. Id.
19. Divorce a vinculo matrimoniiis defined as "a divorce from the bond of marriage.
A total divorce of husband and wife, dissolving the marriage tie, and releasing
the parties wholly from their matrimonial obligations." BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY 566 (4th ed. 1968). See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1976).
20. Adultery is one of the six "causes" for a divorce a vinculo in Maryland. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1976).
21. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602(a)(1). A decree or order concerning a
child is never permanent, despite the language in § 3-602(a)(3). A court of equity
has continuing jurisdiction over the custody of a child. Id. § 3-602(a)(5).
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custody of the
complaint for a divorce a mensa et thoro,2 2 for
25
24
children, 23 and for alimony and child support.
In a pendente lite order 26 issued by the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, custody of the two older children was awarded
to Mr. Davis, while custody of Leigh, the youngest child, was
awarded to Mrs. Davis. 27 Mr. Davis was also ordered to pay $175 per
month to Mrs. Davis for Leigh's support. The court granted a divorce
a vinculo matrimonii to Mr. Davis but reserved ruling on perman-m
ent2 8 custody of the children until a court investigator's report and
recommendation was submitted.2 9 Upon receipt and consideration of
the report, the court issued identical orders to those issued pendente
Appeals of
lite. Mr. Davis noted an appeal 3 to the Court of Special
31
Maryland, seeking custody of the youngest child.
After a review of the findings of fact, the court of special
appeals, reciting the "best interest of the child" test,3 2 concluded that

it was not bound by the clearly erroneous rule, "but must exercise its
own good judgment whether the conclusion of the chancellor is the
best one."' 33 The court noted that "[i]t is the rare case in Maryland
that has awarded custody to an adulterous parent, absent a showing
that the wayward conduct had terminated. '3 4 Basic to the opinion
22. Divorce a mensa et thoro is a "limited divorce.., from bed and board. It grants
unto the injured spouse the right to live separate and apart from the one at fault.
However, the parties remain man and wife and there is no severance of the
marital bonds." Courson v. Courson, 213 Md. 183, 188, 129 A.2d 917, 920. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 16, § 25 (Supp. 1976). For a comparison of divorce a vinculo
matrimonii and a mensa et thoro, see generally, Schwab v. Schwab, 93 Md. 382,
49 A. 331 (1901).
23. See note 21 supra.
24. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §3 (Supp. 1976).
25. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-603(a) (Supp. 1977).
26. Id. § 3-602(a)(3).
27. A pendente lite order is a preliminary order which establishes certain domestic
arrangements during the pendency of litigation. BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1290
(4th ed. 1968).
28. See note 21 supra.
29. 280 Md. at 119, 372 A.2d at 232.
30. Id.
31. Mrs. Davis did not cross-appeal the custody award of the older children. Id. at
121 n.2, 372 A.2d at 232 n.2.
32. 33 Md. App. at 301, 364 A.2d at 133.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 302, 364 A.2d at 133. The court pointed to three such cases. Pratt v. Pratt,
245 Md. 716, 228 A.2d 611 (1967), involved the award of an adolescent daughter
and an infant son to the adulterous parent, even though the court did not make
an express finding of repentence. Orndoff v. Orndoff, 252 Md. 519, 250 A.2d 627
(1967), centered upon less than persuasive evidence of the wife's adultery,
coupled with a finding that the father's petition for custody was merely a means
of retribution. Lastly, the court alluded to Mullinix v. Mullinix, 12 Md. App. 402,
278 A.2d 674 (1971), in which the adulterous parent was deemed fit because the
chancellor had conditioned the award of custody on a prohibition of contact with
her paramour. In Oliver v. Oliver, 217 Md. 222, 140 A.2d 908 (1959), the
chancellor granted the husband an absolute divorce for abandonment, although
the husband joined in one action for absolute divorce two independent causes,

1977]

Casenotes

145

was the theory that once Mr. Davis had overwhelmingly showed his
wife's adultery, there was a shift in the burden of proof.35 The shift
required Mrs. Davis to show a "change" in her course of conduct.
Presumably, the court would have required the threefold test 36 or one

or more of its elements to have been shown. The opinion explicitly
mentioned only repentence and little likelihood of a recurrence,
perhaps incorporating the requirement of termination of the
meretricious relationship. 37 The elements specifically articulated,
however, were characterized as "mandatory. 3 8 Terming the chancellor's determination "erroneous," the court of special appeals found
that the chancellor "failed to consider the long-term effect of having
a child taught her sexual morals by
an unrepentent, flagrantly
39
adulterous and promiscuous parent."
The court of special appeals remarked that Mrs. Davis "failed to
discuss in any manner her adulteries or any change in her way of
life. ' 40 Mrs. Davis claimed, in her appeal to the court of appeals, that
a requirement that she show a "mandatory" repentence and change
of lifestyle violated her right to be free from compulsory selfincrimination. 41 The court of appeals adroitly side-stepped the issue,
and agreed,
for different reasons, that the wrong standard was
42
applied.

The basic premise of the court of appeals' decision in Davis was
that custody disputes should determine who is the "better" parent to

raise the child. 43 The opinion of the chancellor, as well as that of the

court of special appeals and the court of appeals, paid homage to the
so-called "best interests of the child" rule.4 4 A recent Maryland
abandonment and adultery. The chancellor declined to grant the divorce on the
ground of adultery, apparently because he thought that adultery had to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the fact that the Oliver child called
the wife's frequent visitor "Daddy Taylor", referred to "Daddy Taylor's pillow"
on her mother's bed, and to "Daddy Taylor's toothbrush", one might well
question the majority opinion. The opinion did state, however, that despite a
finding of adultery, the court would have reached the same result. Thus, Oliver
could have been some value to the court of appeals' decision in Davis. See
generally 19 Mn. L. REV. 61 (1959).
35. 33 Md. App. at 302, 364 A.2d at 134.
36. Id. at 301, 364 A.2d at 133. The court of special appeals enunciated the terms of
the test as follows: "This presumption of unfitness can be overcome by showing
that the adulterous party has repented, has terminated the relationship, and has
changed his or her ways so that there is little likelihood of a reoccurrence of the
past conduct."
37. Id. at 302-03, 364 A.2d at 134.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 302, 364 A.2d at 134.
40. Id.
41. 280 Md. 119, 126, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (1977), U.S. CONST. amend. V; MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 22.
42. 280 Md. 119, 126, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (1977),
43. Id. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235.
44, Id. at 130, 372 A.2d at 236 (court of appeals); 33 Md. App. 295, 301, 364 A.2d 130,
133 (1976) (court of special appeals).
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decision stated that the best interests of the child rule was "always
determinative in child custody disputes.

' 45

While this rule provided

the central question in such disputes, it failed to suggest an answer.
Each party was faced with the task of showing that he was the
'46
parent who would more advance the "best interests of the child. 7
To facilitate this determination, many guidelines were formulated.4
One such guideline developed into the "presumption of unfitness" or
the "highly persuasive indicium" that an adulterous parent was
unfit. 48 In Palmer v. Palmer,49 for example, the Court of Appeals of

Maryland stated the presumption of unfitness and continued by
saying that, "to overcome this presumption, a strong showing must
be made of the facts and circumstances which indicate that [the
adulterous parent] is, in fact, nevertheless fit and proper."-' The
opinion in Wallis v. Wallis 5 l termed the presumption of unfitness

"one of fact, not law, and the rule is thus not absolute. 5' 2 It was
settled, prior to the Davis decision, that the rule was not designed to
punish the adulterous parent, but was formulated to determine
which parent was better fit to provide the most wholesome
atmosphere, and thus, serve the best interests of the child.5 3 While
the rule never dictated that an adulterous parent was ipso facto
unfit, 54 it operated as a strong weapon, weilded against the guilty

parent.
Davis relegated the adulterous conduct of a parent to the status
merely of a relevant consideration, one that may affect the child's
welfare. 55 Because a finding of adultery was stripped of its
"presumption of unfitness" the guilty parent was impliedly relieved.
of the "mandatory" proffer of the threefold test. 56 The elements of

the threefold test remain important, however. The satisfaction of

45. Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178, 372 A.2d 582, 587 (1977); Kauten v. Kauten,
257 Md. 10, 11, 261 A.2d 759, 760 (1970). See Fanning v. Warfield, 252 Md. 18, 248
A.2d 890 (1969); Heaver v. Bradley, 244 Md. 233, 223 A.2d 568 (1966); Glick v.
Glick, 232 Md. 244, 192 A.2d 791 (1963); Young v. Weaver, 185 Md. 328, 44 A.2d
748 (1945).
46. Levin, GuardianAd Litem In A Family Court, 34 MD.L. REV.341,341-43 (1974).
In this article, Judge Levin aptly characterized the verbal exchanges that take
place in courts as often to the detriment rather than in the "best interests" of the

child.
47. See, e.g., note 16 supra. See generally, W.

GOLDSTEIN,
BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD (1973).

A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,

48. See Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 331, 207 A.2d 481, 483 (1965); Wallis v. Wallis,
235 Md. 33, 36-37, 200 A.2d 164, 165-66 (1964). See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d
6, 38-42 (1969).
49. 238 Md. 327, 207 A.2d 481 (1965).
50. Id., at 331, 207 A.2d at 483.
51. Wallis v. Wallis, 235 Md. 33, 200 A.2d 164 (1964).
52. Id. at 36-37, 200 A.2d at 165-66.
53. Id. See W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.06 (2d ed. 1961).
54. Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 126, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (1977).
55. Id. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235.
56. Id.
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the importance of the fact of
these now-optional elements reduces
57
adultery in child custody awards.
The underpinnings of the Davis opinion were Pontorno v.
58
and Neuwiller v. Neuwiller.59 In Neuwiller, the chancellor
Pontorno
granted the father a divorce a vinculo matrimonii and awarded
custody to the adulterous mother, even though he "made it clear that
he was not overwhelmed with the character of the wife." 60 On
appeal, Judge Finan of the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that
the evidence was "not as clear as the Court should like to see it" with
regard to termination of the adulterous relationship, 6 1 perhaps an
allusion to the threefold test. 62 Despite the finding of adultery and
less than clear evidence of its termination, the chancellor's award to
the guilty parent was affirmed. The majority opinion in Neuwiller,
however, may be read as weighing different "presumptions." More
emphasis may have been placed on the "presumption" that a young
child should stay with its mother 63 than on the "presumption" of the
unfitness of an adulterous parent. The dissent in Neuwiller, written
by Judge Barnes, concluded "that the adulterous mother had not
made a clear showing rebutting the presumption that she is an unfit
person to have custody. ' 64 Judge Barnes' adamant disagreement
with the majority opinion may have been based on evidence that the
her paramour, and that she had
mother had become pregnant by 65
performed an abortion on herself.
In Pontorno v. Pontorno,6 6 the evidence revealed, by inference, a
disposition as well as numerous opportunities to commit adultery by
the wife and her paramour. 67 The paramour was found to have been
"continuously in the picture," before the separation, during the
separation, and even after service of the complaint alleging
adultery. 6 Custody of the young daughters, age three years and
eighteen months respectively, was awarded to the father. 69 The
Pontorno opinion made no mention of a presumption of unfitness of
an adulterous parent, a point mentioned in the Davis opinion. 70
Pontorno did state, as quoted the court of appeals in Davis, 71 that a

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
257 Md. 576, 263 A.2d 820 (1970).
257 Md. 285, 262 A.2d 736 (1970).
Id. at 286, 262 A.2d at 737.
Id.
See note 36 supra.
257 Md. 285, 286-87, 262 A.2d 736, 737 (1970).
Id. at 291, 262 A.2d at 740.
Id. at 286, 262 A.2d at 737.
257 Md. 576, 263 A.2d 820 (1970).
Id. at 580, 263 A.2d at 822.
Id. at 578, 263 A.2d at 821.
Id. at 580, 263 A.2d at 822.
Davis, 280 Md. at 127, 372 A.2d at 235.
Id.
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"finding of adultery is relevant to the extent that it may affect the
72
welfare of the children."
The Pontorno opinion, however, was complicated by a number of
considerations, some of which tended to weaken its precedential
value to the Davis decision. Pontorno, like Neuwiller, applied the
"best interest of the child" test. 73 In Pontorno, the court of appeals,
indicated that had the chancellor awarded custody to the father
solely because of the wife's adultery, the court "might be disposed to
remand or reverse. ' ' 71 This may lend support to Davis' reliance on
Pontorno, but only when viewed in isolation, for the Pontornocourt
added that "[i]n cases where the chancellor has found that the party
guilty of the adultery has ceased the relationship. . . the Court has
upheld the Chancellor's decision to grant custody to the guilty
party."7 5 The natural implication of the court's statement involved
the threefold test's first element, termination of the relationship. As
customarily applied, evidence of termination of such a relationship
was submitted to rebut the presumption of unfitness of an adulterous
parent, yet the Pontorno court mentioned no such presumption.
Pontorno did add, however, that the award of custody to a guilty
party who had terminated the relationship was particularly likely
where the mother was the adulterous parent and the children
involved were young.7 6 To compound the confusion, the Pontorno
opinion termed the mother's fitness better to care for her young
children a "presumption." 77 In sum, Portorno employed the "best
interests of the child" test, the "presumption" that a mother was
better fit for custody of young children, and the "relevance" of
adultery as it affects the welfare of the child. In application, the
result of the above is a confusion of labels, a rebuttal of the
"presumption" that a mother was better fit for custody of a young
child by a "factor," that of adultery. The Pontorno opinion implied,
however, that adultery alone may not overcome the "presumption"
of the mother's superior fitness, especially if the relationship
between the mother and her paramour had ended. What may well
have been conceived as a means to determine who is a better
custodian became a conflict of presumptions and considerations, the
nuances of each changing with the facts of each case. This confusion
may have caused the court of appeals to state, in the first sentence of
Davis, that "we refuse to be cast in the role of a super Solomon." 7 8

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Pontorno v. Pontorno, 257 Md. 576, 580, 263 A.2d 820, 822 (1970).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 580-81, 263 A.2d at 822.
Id. at 581, 263 A.2d at 822.
Id.
280 Md. at 120, 372 A.2d at 231. In a footnote the court alluded to King Solomon
in 1 Kings 3:16. Davis cited Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, 237 Pa.
Super. Ct. 192, 352 A.2d 459 (1975), rev'd, 468 Pa. 134, 360 A.2d 587 (1976). See
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The Davis opinion relieved the appellate courts of "super
Solomon" demands by setting out clear standards of appellate
review, standards which favored the affirmance of a chancellor's
factual findings and ultimate conclusions.7 9 Davis has not relieved
the chancellor, however, from the task of making factual findings
and drawing ultimate conclusions when an adulterous parent seeks
custody of his child. Since Davis dispelled the "presumption" of
unfitness, the chancellor must weigh an adulterous parent's conduct
"with all other pertinent factors," but only as it affects the child's
welfare.80
The large number of child custody disputes is one of the most
difficult concomittant problems of the alarming divorce rate.8 ' Rules
of law, as well as presumptions of fact, that have been formulated
have been often criticized.8 2 One commentator stated that "historically, custody awards have been dictated or controlled by amorphous
platitudes or generalizations on one hand and by rigid absolutes on
the other. '8 3 At one point, Maryland was cited as having the
"strictest" rule concerning the fitness of an adulterous parent, a rule
demanding that "a mother who has committed adultery must make
a strong showing to overcome the presumption that she is unfit to
have custody."8 4 During the 1950's, however, a general national
trend became discernable. The trend treated adulterous mothers
more leniently in child custody proceedings,8 5 perhaps relying on the
maternal preference. Davis v. Davis reflected this more lenient
approach, although leniency was no longer limited by an underlying
maternal preference. 86 Rather, the Davis decision recognized by
implication that adulterous conduct described too large a realm of
behavior to have justified a presumption of unfitness, even if it could
be rebutted by a time-honored test.8 7 Davis encouraged a greater
consideration of other factors in a custody dispute. The opinion
generally Shepherd, Solomon's Sword: Adjudication of Child Custody Questions,
8 U. RICH. L. REV. 151 (1974).

79. See note 10 supra.
80. See note 3 supra.
81. "According to the latest report on marriage issued by the National Center for
Health Statistics in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 455 out
of every 1000 marriages made in this country last year are destined to wind up in
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relegated adultery to the category of a "factor," rather than
elevating the importance of adultery at the cost of slighting factors
that may be critical to the best interests of the child.
What the Davis decision will require of the practitioner is
difficult to predict with any certainty. One may well argue that
Davis made simply an academic distinction, characterizing adultery
as a pertinent fact rather than as a presumption. It is clear that
counsel for the parties in custody proceedings should squarely
address the issue of adultery. In dealing with the issue, termination
of the relationship, repentence, and little likelihood of recurrence
remain salient, common-sense facts to be demonstrated, even if such
a proffer is no longer mandatory.8 8 Under the banner of "best
interests of the child," each party should marshall the factual
information that reflects his ability to promote the child's best
interests. Acrimony and vengefulness on the part of the innocent
parent, however, may damage an otherwise convincing argument.8 9
Davis dictated that the future of the child, and not the past
adulterous acts of a parent, must be the central concern. A
"presumption" of unfitness loses sight of the primary goal of the
court, insuring the best home and environment for the child
involved. The adversary nature of custody proceedings in conjunction with "presumptions" of unfitness only exacerbate the parties'
feeling that a child is a "spoil of victory." The Davis decision
mandated a discriminating examination of the fitness of each
parent, unencumbered by a "presumption" arising from the past.
Davis served to realign the focus of custody disputes back to the
child.
Raymond L. Bank
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